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processing and personal level phenomenol-
ogy. Leaving this difficult issue aside, now 
consider the psychological evidence that 
suggests vision is indeterminate, evidence 
which may fit nicely with the suggestion 
that visual processing uses probabilistic 
coding.
Two lines of empirical evidence show 
that visual perception is an ongoing pro-
cess which involves repeated sampling of 
the environment. Such a structure to visual 
perception fits naturally with a probabilis-
tic interpretation: we take repeated samples 
in order to update our best estimate of the 
way the world is. First, our experience of 
the visual periphery is highly indetermi-
nate (Cohen and Dennett, 2011). We are 
able to experience parts of the world in a 
determinate manner through our ability 
continuously to gain different perspectives 
through action (Findlay and Gilchrist, 
2003). Second, both inattentional blind-
ness (Mack and Rock, 1998) and change 
blindness (Rensink et al., 1997) paradigms 
suggest that our experience of the world 
can lack basic details. Both of these lines of 
evidence fit nicely with an understanding 
of visual experience as probabilistic. The 
indeterminacy of the visual periphery can 
be interpreted as a probabilistic representa-
tional format. Similarly, the missing details 
as revealed in inattentional and change 
blindness experiments reveal that our gen-
erative models are more successful with the 
gist of a visual scene and offer only vague 
estimates about the details.
In short, both the general a priori struc-
ture of perception and recent evidence in 
perceptual psychology converge on the 
theme that visual experience involves inde-
terminate implicit anticipations. This theme 
fits quite well with the suggestion, explored 
by Clark, that the brain actively predicts 
A commentary on
Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated 
agents, and the future of cognitive science
by Clark, A. (in press). Behav. Brain Sci. 
In the target article, Andy Clark addresses 
the question of how a probabilistic pre-
dictive coding model of the mind relates 
to our personal level mental lives. This 
question, he suggests, is “potentially the 
most important” (MS46). The question is 
important indeed, but Clark’s answer fails 
to capitalize on another possible advantage 
of this approach. Clark suggests that there 
is a disconnect between the way the world 
appears to us, on one hand, and the way 
that it is represented in the brain, on the 
other. He deals with this disconnect by lim-
iting the scope of the theory, by pointing 
out that he is discussing a theory of how 
brains encode and process information, not 
a theory about how things seem to organ-
isms with such brains. The shortcoming 
of this strategy is that there may not be a 
disconnect to begin with. That is, perhaps 
the world does appear to us as if it were 
“encoded as an intertwined set of probabil-
ity density distributions” (MS47). If such is 
the case, then explanations which appeal to 
a probabilistic predictive model gain even 
more scope and power. Here I will offer a 
sketch of both a priori and empirical sup-
port for my claim.
One emerging theme in the philosophi-
cal literature is that perception involves 
implicit anticipation of the way appear-
ances change (Noë, 2004; Siegel, 2006; 
Madary, 2012). Here is an outline of the 
motivation behind this view. The fact that 
we are embodied perceivers entails that we 
are always limited to a single perspective 
on the world at one time. Perception faces 
the task of representing properties despite 
only having access to a single appearance of 
those properties at any time. A straightfor-
ward way to handle this task is to represent 
 properties by implicitly anticipating how 
appearances of those properties will change 
as we move. As those anticipations are ful-
filled, we gain more evidence for our rep-
resentation. It would be natural, following 
Clark and others, to account for perceptual 
anticipations in a probabilistic manner. If 
an object looks like a tree from one per-
spective, it is probable that it will continue 
to look like a tree from other perspectives. 
This kind of perceptual anticipation is not 
usually the center of our attention, but, 
crucially, neither is it hidden away in sub-
personal code. We can plainly observe the 
changing appearances of static properties 
and we are surprised when appearances do 
not change as they should.
This point raises the tricky question of 
the relationship between personal level sur-
prise, on one hand, and the sub-personal 
prediction error, known as “surprisal,” on 
the other (MS5). Personal level surprise is 
an experience with which we are all famil-
iar, and sub-personal surprisal is a key 
component of the approach that Clark is 
exploring. The relationship between the 
two strikes me as an important unsolved 
issue. In the target article, Clark offers a 
reconciliation for the apparent discon-
nect between personal level surprise and 
sub-personal surprisal (MS46). Elsewhere, 
though, Clark concedes that “Although the 
psychological notion of surprise is distinct, 
events with high surprisal are generally sur-
prising” (Friston et al., 2012, p. 1). I suggest 
that an account of when and why surprisal 
(sub-personal) is surprising (personal) will 
be key for addressing the larger question of 
the relationship between sub-personal level 
How would the world look if it looked as if it were encoded as 
an intertwined set of probability density distributions?
Michael Madary*
Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, Mainz, Germany
*Correspondence: madary@uni-mainz.de
Edited by:
Shimon Edelman, Cornell University, USA
Reviewed by:
Axel Cleeremans, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium
www.frontiersin.org October 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 419 | 1
General Commentary
published: 18 October 2012
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00419
Received: 30 August 2012; accepted: 30 September 2012; 
published online: 18 October 2012.
Citation: Madary M (2012) How would the world look 
if it looked as if it were encoded as an intertwined set of 
probability density distributions? Front. Psychology 3:419. 
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00419
This article was submitted to Frontiers in Theoretical 
and Philosophical Psychology, a specialty of Frontiers in 
Psychology.
Copyright © 2012 Madary. This is an open-access arti-
cle distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution License, which permits use, distribution, and 
reproduction in other forums, provided the original authors 
and source are credited and subject to any copyright notices 
concerning any third-party graphics etc.
sensory inputs in a probabilistic manner. 
Far from the conflict that Clark supposes, 
the predictive generative model of percep-
tual processing might complement our best 
account of the phenomenology of vision.
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